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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper extends an earlier proposed framework and thus empirically 
examining the effect of board equity ownership on the performance of banks 
in an era of post banking crisis that called for a bailout reform in Nigeria. 
This board attribute is selected based on the peculiar problem of the banking 
sector, and based on the board functions that captures monitoring (agency 
theory based). Based on a survey data, the result of our analysis revealed a 
significant relationship between board of directors’ equity ownership and 
banks performance. We therefore, suggest more regulation and enforcement 
of this as it motivates and compels boards to be more vigorous at monitoring 
CEOs/top managements.
Keywords: Corporate governance; board equity ownership; banks 
performance
1.  INTRODUCTION
Banking as a financial sub-sector is one of the most regulated sector due 
to its immense support to the overall economic growth and development 
of any nation. The intensive and sensitive financial operations makes it 
inevitable to fully secure the transactional processes in order to stabilize 
the system from economic shocks, failure, and also protect depositors, 
investors etc. In the Nigerian financial sector, poor managerial 
performance and poor corporate governance (CG) had been identified 
as the major factors in virtually all known cases of a financial institution’s 
distress in the country which even led to consolidation reform in 2004, 
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and yet re-emerged afterwards, and led to another reform in late 2009 
that necessitated the bail-out of ten (10) banks which nearly collapsed 
due to high non-performing loans, poor CG, bad liquidity and risk 
management (CBN, 2010). The bail-out reform became the only rescue 
program which could ensure the continuous survival of the banking 
industry by injecting N620 billion. This bail-out reform generated a lot 
of panic and doubt concerning the status of the investments of these 
banks’ depositors, shareholders and other Nigerians consequently, led 
to a sparked interest in examining the potential outcome of this reform 
through researches.
However, this paper aims at testing empirically, a part of an earlier 
proposed framework. Thus, this paper has examine the potential 
relevance of board equity ownership (BEO) in enhancing the performance 
of these bail-out banks. This study is hence is proposing a framework 
that selects the most appropriate board variables that best address the 
banks’ CG problems peculiar to Nigeria. This framework, unique as 
it is, aims at covering only the bailed-out banks with a total of 2,811 
branches in Nigeria using a primary source of data (questionnaire). 
There is paucity of studies in Nigerian context that conceptualised BEO 
as a performance booster and then evaluating based on financial and 
non-financial performance. 
The mid 2000s actually witnessed a renewed academic interest in the 
area of CG and firm performance mainly due to the prevalence of 
global financial crisis. However, most researches conducted globally 
and Nigeria in particular, are reported with conflicting findings as a 
result of factors like; inconsistent operationalization of board variables, 
limited scope, and convenience samples (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Studies in the Nigerian context which adopts this 
variable that captures board control or monitoring role are very rare, 
hence the need to be re-examined to  inconclusive relations/findings. 
Also, most of the studies on CG in Nigerian context are either conducted 
before the banks’ bail-out, or not in the area of bail-out reform or not 
covering the banking sector such as Adekoya, (2011); Okereke, Abu, & 
Anyanwu, (2011); Onakoya, Ofoegbu, & Fasanya, (2012); Uwuigbe & 
Fakile, (2012). Only few studies were found on bail-out such as “Kuye, 
Ogundele, & Otike-Obaro, (2013); Nworji, (2011); Oghojafor, Olayemi, 
Okonjia, & Okolie, (2010)”, which all have certain kind of shortcomings, 
small sample, addressing policy issue not the banks’ performance etc. 
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Specifically studies on CG covering both financial and non-financial 
performance are very rare in Nigeria except Ogbechie et al., (2009). 
The result of our analysis revealed that BEO had a significant positive 
relationship with performance.  Tis paper recommends that BODs equity 
ownership must be enforced in order to improve corporate governance 
practices in firms. This outcome is of immense importance to academics, 
regulators, shareholders, and other Nigerians as it will reveal the 
contribution of BEO in strengthening board of directors’ functions in 
ensuring good banks’ performance.  The paper is subdivided into six (6) 
sections from introduction, literature review, methodology, discussion 
and conclusion, limitation, then reference.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.  Corporate governance and board monitoring function (agency 
theory based)
Also, this study adopts agency theory in the framework as in de Villiers, 
Naiker, & van Staden, (2011); Hillman & Dalziel, (2003) which opined 
that boards have the functions of  monitoring management’s activities. 
Agency theorist asserts that management initiates and implements 
business plans, strategies, and systems whereas directors monitor it (de 
Villiers et al., 2011; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Under this view, independent 
directors and directors who own shares will be more likely to monitor 
rigorously (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003).This study therefore, propose this board variable in this 
paper which reflect directors’ monitoring role (driven by agency theory). 
Additionally, these variable is actually selected based on its prominent 
importance in solving the practical problem of corporate governance in 
Nigerian banks as mentioned in (Sanusi, 2010)
According to the agency theorists, firms are often characterized by a 
conflict of interest between firms’ management and shareholders, where 
managers usually exploit their control over firm operations to increase 
their short-term wealth at the expense of shareholders’ long-term 
interests as opined by Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). However, the presence of vigilant directors can reduce such 
agency costs by close monitoring of firm management activities, control 
system (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Westphal, 
1999). Directors who intensely monitor management, are more likely 
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to demand explanations for management’s strategic initiatives and 
to criticize misguided initiatives (de Villiers et al., 2011; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999). However, to the best of our knowledge, no study 
has been conducted using these selected variable together in a single 
framework on the Nigerian bail-out banks. 
2.2. Board equity ownership
Practically, the implementation of CBN code of corporate governance 
in Nigeria, posed some challenges, prominent among which were: 
ambiguities regarding the appointment of independent directors and the 
share ownership status of these independent directors(CBN, 2008). Thus, 
it has been an unresolved debate concerning the potential importance/ 
effect of board members’ equity ownership on both the board functional 
performance and firm performance. Albring et al. (2013), opined that 
in the USA, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), among others, suggests 
that director stock ownership should reduce agency problems and 
therefore the need for external monitoring. Thus, in an attempt to make 
a proper alignment of the interest of director and shareholders, many 
boards have implemented stock ownership guidelines and holding 
requirements for directors, leading to a substantial rise in the ownership 
of managers and directors but in Nigeria, there exist ambiguities and 
challenges regarding the directors share ownership status (CBN, 2008).
There exist conflicting researchers views regarding this which uptil 
now, no clear position is given by the CBN. This show the real extent 
of the misconception on whether or not equity ownership by the board 
of Directors would influence their mandated functions. Also, the 
percentage of the shareholding is still not clearly determined. However, 
Bhagat & Bolton, (2008); de Villiers et al., (2011); Hillman & Dalziel, 
(2003) opined that Stock ownership aligns the interests of the directors 
with those of shareholders. Bhagat & Bolton, (2008)’s study further 
revealed that particularly in poor firm performance, the likelihood 
of disciplinary management turnover (replacement) is positively 
correlated with stock ownership of board members. As such, directors 
with more equity ownership are likely to objectively evaluate firm 
performance and control firm choices. Similarly, Weisbach (1988) also 
reported that CEO replacement in poorly performing firms was greater 
as the representation of independent outside directors increases. Board 
members (both executive and non-executive) share ownership reduces 
manager/shareholder conflicts to the extent that executive board 
members own part of the firm, they develop shareholder-like interests 
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and are less likely to engage in behaviour that is detrimental to firms’ / 
shareholders interest. 
On the contrary view, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) reported no correlation 
between board’s ownership and firm performance, and opined that there 
trivial support for the divergence of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that contribution of board’s 
ownership is considered as a “two-edged knife” in which there is an 
optimal level of board ownership which contributes positively to a firm’s 
performance. However, the study of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
revealed that firm performance first improves as ownership rises up to 
5%, then falls as ownership increases up to 25% and then rises slightly 
at higher ownership. McConnell and Servaes (1990) provide further 
evidence on the relation between the distribution of equity ownership 
and firm value and find a significant curvilinear relation between them. 
By and large, board ownership, was viewed as an encouragement that 
will help board members supervise management in a more efficient 
way. Consistent with the positive view, (Chung & Pruitt, 1996; Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995) supported that, board’s ownership will 
improve firm’s performance and are positively correlated. More related 
to this study, (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; de Villiers et al., 2011; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Westphal, 1999), show that director ownership influence 
or improves boards’ monitoring of strategic decision making. (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003) argue that ownership incentives motivate directors to 
forgo short- term returns for long-term projects and strategies. 
The study further argues consistent with many studies like Albring et 
al., (2013), Bhagat and Bolton, (2008); de Villiers et al., (2011); Guest, 
(2008)that, if these banks’ board of directors were having a substantial 
equity ownership in the banks or compensated with equity as incentives 
for a targeted performance, they would definitely have monitored and 
counselled those sacked incompetent/fraudulent banks’ managements. 
In the current aftermath of banking crisis, it is plausible that higher 
ownership could motivate directors to monitor and provide resources 
(advices, counsel connections etc.) to management which will in-turn 
lead to higher firm performance in the long run.  Thus, we form the 
following proposition: 
H.1 Equity share ownership of board of directors is positively related 
with the bail-out banks’ performance.
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3. METHODOLOGY
This paper adopted a survey research method, and collected data by 
use of a questionnaires which were administered to branch, middle & 
top managers of bailed-out banks. This paper had a population of 2,811 
branches from the ten (10) bailed-out banks in Nigeria. The sample size 
is 338 determined through sample size formula/table of  Dillman (2000), 
Krejcie and Morgan (1970). Although a 50% was added to the sample 
size making it to be 507 in order to cater for low or non-response bias 
(Salkind, 1997).  Using a stratified sampling technique, the number of 
branches for each bank were drawn proportionately to the total number 
of branches in their respective strata (banks). The collected data was 
screened at the preliminary stage and few missing data treated, outliers 
deleted and then normality and multicollinearity tests conducted 
revealing a good data that is normally distributed. This study adopts 
the Balance scorecard (BSC) performance model which was developed 
by Kaplan and Norton (1996). The measures consist both financial and 
non-financial measures which serves as indicators used in monitoring 
strategy implementation throughout the organization and whether 
strategic goals are being achieved or not (Bremser & Chung, 2005).
This paper adopts Partial Least Square (Smart-PLS) to run this 
multivariate test in order to analyse or test the hypothesized relationships 
in the study. PLS approach is commonly used in most recent researches 
due to its capability of analysing the relationship between the latent 
constructs and their measures, modelled in a reflective or formative 
ways as well as hybrid formative and reflective constructs (Hair et al., 
2014). Smart-PLS 2.0 (Ringle et al., 2005) is used for assessing the path 
model and estimated the parameters based on path weighting scheme 
(Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2012). In this paper, we firstly assessed the 
measurement model and then followed by the structural model from 
which our results is presented sequentially.  In this study, the model is 
a reflective measurement model and therefore the quality criteria used 
comprises the composite reliability (CR) which examines the internal 
consistency, average variance extracted (AVE) which examines the 
convergence validity and then Fornell-Larcker criterion, & Loadings-
cross loadings which examines discriminant validity.
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3.1.  Measurement model
The result of the measurement model basically interprets the goodness 
of the measures through the reliability and validity as shown in the 
subsequent tables. Apparently, there are three quality evaluation criteria 
namely; (1) the significance level of factor loadings of all items, then 
(2) the Composite Reliability (CR) of the items should be at least 0.7 
and above, and (3) the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) should be at 
least 0.5 and above (Henseler et al., 2012). The Goodness of measures 
are determined through the measurement model by revealing the 
relationships between the items that measures each construct and other 
constructs in the model. The Reliability test evaluates how consistently 
measuring instruments measures the what it is meant to measure, while 
validity tests evaluates how well an instrument measures an exact 
concept it is designed to measure (Hair  et al., 2014). 
In this study, the measurement model was examined through the outer 
model by evaluating the relationship that exist between constructs and 
their indicators (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). As displayed in 
Table 1 below, the convergent validity was achieved because the internal 
consistency reliability represented by composite reliability is actually 
within the range of .75 to .92 hence, exceeding the required minimum 
of .70. As for the average variance extracted (AVE), the minimum 
requirement of .50 is also exceeded for all the constructs in the model 
(Hair et al., 2012). Performance was subjected to second order based on 
(FP and NP) and also have achieved all. The discriminant validity is 
assessed in two ways. Firstly, using Fornell-Larcker (1998) criterion in 
Table 2, the square roots of AVEs were exhibited diagonally while the 
off the diagonal figures signifies the squared inter-construct correlations 
and it could be seen that all the AVEs exceeds the squared inter-
construct correlations, signifying the achievement of the requirement 
for discriminant validity. Discriminant validity was further confirmed 
through ensuring that all indicators’ loadings were actually more than 
their respective cross loadings in the model. After these were examined, 
we thus testifies that the reliability and validity of our constructs was 
satisfactorily achieved (Hair et al., 2014).
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Convergence Validity and Reliability Analysis (Item loadings, Average 
variance extracted and Internal consistencies)
Table 1: Results of the Measurement Model
Constructs Items Loadings AVE Composite Reliability
Board Equity 
Ownership
BEO3 .551 .509 .752
BEO4 .773
BEO5 .790
Financial Performance FP10  .780 .522 .867
FP5 .778
FP6 .728
FP7 .697
FP8 .623
FP9 .718
N o n - f i n a n c i a l 
Performance
NP11 .730 .508 .892
NP12 .713
NP13 .649
NP14 .713
NP15 .708
NP16 .743
NP17 .784
NP18 .651
Performance FP .904 .855
NP .946
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Table 2: Discriminant Validity (Square root of AVE and Latent Variable Correlations
Constructs BEO FP NP
Board Equity 
Ownership (BEO) 
.713
F i n a n c i a l 
Performance (FP)
.291 .723
N o n - f i n a n c i a l 
Performance (NP) .331 .716 .713
Note: The bolded diagonal figures are the square root of the variance 
(AVE) shared between the constructs and their measures while the off-
diagonal figures were the correlations among constructs.
Basically before the structural model, multicollinearity was further 
assessed and as known, there is no need for that because only one variable 
is involved in the analysis hence, this confirms that no multicollinearity 
exists among constructs of this study. Normally the VIFs values should 
be less than the 5.00 threshold (Hair et al., 2014).
After this, then the structural model is evaluated to test the significance 
of the paths and thus reveal the supportive or otherwise of the developed 
hypotheses. The next figure 3 is the structural model showing the t- 
value of the path.
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Figure 1: Structural Model
In examining the structural model’s relationships the path coefficients 
significance, and R² value were measured (Hair et al., 2014). This paper 
used the mart-PLS standard bootstrapping method with 5000 bootstrap 
samples to evaluate the significance of the path coefficients (Hair et 
al., 2014; Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper, & Ringle, 2012; Henseler, Ringle, & 
Sinkovics, 2009). The results of the hypotheses testing, their coefficients, 
 values and the p v lue  wer  all resented in Table 5. From the above 
figure 2, and table 5, it can be seen that all the hypothesized relationship 
were supported.
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Table 4: Result of Hypotheses Test
Hypotheses Relationship Beta S t d . 
Error
T Value P 
Value
Decision
H1 BEO -> PERFM  .331 .046 7.126 .000 Supported
4.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study have tested the existing agency theory presumption in 
respect to the possible effect of board equity shareholding by taking 
managers’ perception regarding its influence on performance. This 
study had magnificently conceptualised performance as a second order 
hierarchical construct, signifying that all two dimensions (financial 
and non-financial) expressively reflect performance. The theory’s 
assumption is found to be supported by our result. 
From the result from table 4 above, it is found that Equity ownership 
of BODs (BEO) has a significant effect on banks performance revealing 
(β=.331, t=7.126) confirming a strong relationship exist between them. 
The strength of the path is so extremely good that the hypothesis is 
accepted at even 1% level of significance. Hence, this hypothesis is 
supported.
The implication of this is that equity shares ownership by board of 
directors of a bank definitely influences them to effectively monitors, 
advice, counsels, and guide their executive managements during 
strategic decision making. Our results is consistent with the previous 
studies like Albring et al., (2013), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Bhagat 
et al., (1999) who contend that board equity ownership motivates 
directors to vigorously evaluates CEO/management’s performance, 
firm performance, be involve in strategic decision making and also 
deliberate on issues before approving them.  The rationale is that their 
share ownership aligns their interest with that of other shareholders, 
therefore, they will be effective at monitoring, and resource provision 
because they want to protect their investments (de Villiers et al., 2011; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
This study contributes immensely to the growing literature by confirming 
that BEO influences, motivates directors by improving their functional 
effectiveness in providing advisory, guidance, and other resources to the 
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managements’ overall strategic control system. Secondly, the findings of 
this research will provide significant contribution to the managers and 
banks regulators like CBN, NDIC etc. This results thus, implies that with 
a substantial BEO, banks stand a chance of having a better performance 
after the bail-out reform. 
Thirdly, equity ownership by board of directors must be specifically 
regulated and enforced by CBN because the a CBN annual supervision 
report of 2008 stated that “there exist an ambiguity regarding equity 
ownership of directors” (CBN, 2008) and therefore, it is not surprising 
that lack of substantial equity ownership in their banks made the 
BODs refused to dismiss and replace the poor performing CEOs in 
their respective banks. However, the likelihood of replacing CEO/top 
management for disciplinary reasons when circumstances warrants is 
part of the monitoring process which is only motivated and ensured if 
the directors are having a substantial equity shares ownership in the 
company (Albring et al., 2013; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Bhagat et al., 1999; 
Zahra, 1996).
5.  LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE STUDIES
Our study is limited to examining only the overall performance 
(comprising both financial and non-financial) as a single second-order 
reflective construct. Therefore, the result is only indicating the effect 
of BEO on overall performance without knowing the relative effect on 
each of the two dimensions. Also, our sample is restricted to only the 
bailed-out banks in Nigeria.
Future research should therefore examine the effect of BEO on both 
financial and non-financial performance together as two different 
endogenous variables so as to determine their response to BEO. In 
respect sample size, future studies should look into the whole banks in 
the industry.
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